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he misguided belief that “this time is different” led policy-makers to permit the credit 
boom of the early 2000s to continue for too long, thus preparing the ground for the 
biggest financial crisis in living memory. But now, when it comes to recovery, the 
belief that this time should not be different might be equally dangerous. 
Many  policy-makers  and  economists  have  observed  that  the  recovery  from  the  2007-08 
financial crisis has been much slower than most recoveries of the post-war era, which needed 
only a little more than a year, on average, to restore output and employment to the previous 
level.  By  this  standard  the  current  recovery  is  unacceptably  slow,  with  both  output  and 
employment still below the previous peak three years later. Policy-makers thus feel justified 
in using all available macroeconomic levers to achieve a recovery that resembles those of the 
past. 
In doing so, policy-makers are reluctant to take into account that the recent crisis resulted 
from an unprecedented credit boom gone bust. To some extent, it should have been logical to 
expect an unprecedented upturn as well. When the crisis erupted, many hoped for a V-
shaped recovery, notwithstanding a substantial body of research showing that recoveries 
from recessions caused by a financial crisis tend to be weaker and slower than recoveries 
from “normal” recessions. 
The  observation  that  recoveries  following  a  financial  crisis  are  different  suggests  that 
standard  macroeconomic  policies  might  not  work  as  one  would  usually  expect.  A 
transatlantic comparison suggests that this may indeed be the case. 
One  would  expect  that  the  shock  from  the  financial  crisis  should  be  comparable  for  the 
United States and the eurozone, given that they are of similar size, exhibit a similar degree of 
internal diversity and experienced a similar increase in house prices (on average) in the years 
preceding the bust. Moreover, the relative increase in debt (leverage) in the financial system 
was similar on both sides of the Atlantic. 
And, indeed, US economic performance has been very similar to that of the eurozone since 
the start of the crisis: GDP per capita today is still about 2% below the 2007 level on both sides 
of the Atlantic. The unemployment rate in the US and the eurozone has increased by about 
the same amount as well – three percentage points. 
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Of course, one can point to particular countries in Europe that are mired in recession. But the 
US also has depressed areas. For Ireland and Spain, read Nevada and California (and, for 
Greece,  read  Puerto  Rico).  The  proper  comparison  is  thus  between  the  average  of  two 
continental-sized  economies,  both  of  which  are  characterized  by  considerable  internal 
diversity. 
These similarities in economic performance are striking, given that macroeconomic policy in 
the US and the eurozone has been so different. The US let its fiscal deficit rise above 10% of 
GDP, compared to less than 6% of GDP in the eurozone. Measured over a five-year period 
(2007-12), the US has thus not done any better than the eurozone, although it has relied on a 
much  larger  dose  of  fiscal  expansion.  In  the  US  (and  the  United  Kingdom),  the  general 
government deficit today is still around 8% of GDP, compared to a little more than 3% of 
GDP in the eurozone. 
In  fact,  the  economy  that  has  imbibed  the  strongest  dose  of  expansionary  policy  has 
recovered the most weakly: GDP per capita in the UK today is still 6% below the 2007 level. 
Of  course,  one  could  argue  that  the  UK  was  particularly  exposed  to  the  bust,  because 
financial services make up a large part of its GDP. But the fact remains that its economy, 
which is supposed to be the most flexible in Europe, has not recovered from the shock five 
years  later,  despite  massive  fiscal  and  monetary  stimulus,  coupled  with  a  substantial 
devaluation. 
On balance, it thus seems that this time – or, rather, this post-crisis environment – really is 
different, and that macroeconomic policies have done little to improve matters. Countries 
like the US and the UK, which are accumulating debt at a record pace, are betting that deficit 
spending  will  eventually  pay  off  in  a  stronger  economy.  But  they  risk  ending  up  with 
debt/GDP ratios north of 100%, which would leave them at the mercy of financial markets 
should sentiment turn against them. 
History suggests that interest rates will not remain at record-low levels forever, and that 
when change comes, it might be abrupt. Why should we expect this time to be different? 